We and Atomic Bombs
By TIMOFEI Bordachev 14-09-2024
The presence of colossal stockpiles of nuclear weapons in two or three great military powers reduces the likelihood of a general war in its traditional sense. However, the state of “a world that will not be at peace” promised by George Orwell also looks like it is balancing on the edge of something that would render any theoretical constructions meaningless, writes Valdai Club Programme Director Timofei Bordachev.
In the year 1945, George Orwell, a renowned author of dystopian fiction, published a column titled “You and the Atomic Bomb”. Addressing a wide readership, the 20th century literary luminary suggested that the impact of the technological innovation called nuclear weapons on the course of history would be much greater than anything that had ever happened before.
Now we are very likely approaching the moment when the course of world politics itself can either confirm or, to our great chagrin, refute Orwell’s judgments and the predictions based on them.
The complexity of the current situation is further compounded by the fact that even the experience of the past global confrontation between nuclear powers has failed to provide a panacea: their position in the world has changed significantly over the past 30 years, and the most acute indirect conflict is taking place in maximum physical proximity to the main administrative and industrial centres of Russia.
That is why many respectable observers now have some concerns about the correctness of the US strategy, which in its most general terms seeks to reproduce the logic and tactical skill of the previous confrontation with Russia in 1945-1991.
If we try to briefly outline Orwell’s idea, it comes down to the fact that the acquisition by two or three powers of colossal opportunities to destroy not only each other, but also all of humanity changes the entire disposition of world history.
Previously, as we know, it was always based on the ability of powers to revolutionise the existing world order, the consequences of which would serve as the basis for the next one.
Now, Orwell writes, all countries of the world are deprived of the opportunity to even think that such a revolution will be successful for them. This is particularly true for nuclear powers, as a general war would result in their certain destruction, and for smaller and medium-sized powers due to their incomparable military capabilities.
At first glance, everything is correct — by acting in the same way, none of the emerging powers can qualitatively change their position in the world, i. e. decisively resorting to military force.
Therefore, it can be deduced that it is not possible to defeat a nuclear power militarily, and that the only real threat to them lies within themselves. That is, the inability of their political systems to keep the population in comparative harmony of ideas about justice in relation to their interests.
As Orwell notes: “Had the atomic bomb turned out to be something as cheap and easily manufactured as a bicycle or an alarm clock, it might well have plunged us back into barbarism, but it might, on the other hand, have meant the end of national sovereignty and of the highly-centralised police State.”
The first is confirmed so far — even economically powerful China does not yet have, apparently, arsenals comparable to those of Russia and the United States. The second — “an end to large-scale wars” — still requires additional evidence. Accumulating this evidence is a crucial aspect of contemporary world politics, regardless of how challenging it may be to contemplate our own future under such circumstances.
Orwell writes that nuclear superpowers are invincible states and therefore “in a state of permanent cold war with their neighbours.” Yes, that is exactly how it looks, since a cold war is known to be an alternative to a hot one.
Few people would dispute the fact that not all aspects of US or Russian foreign policies are entirely acceptable to their neighbours; especially in the case of the Americans, for whom control over others is an important part of their own prosperity in the understanding of the political establishment and its sponsors.
In recent years, we have seen many examples of the US treating its European or Asian allies very harshly. Germany lost its economic privileges during the conflict between Russia and the West. France was reduced to the position of America’s junior partner, although it itself has some nuclear weapons.
Similarly, Japan and South Korea find themselves with foreign policy largely determined by Washington, often through direct pressure, leaving them with little opportunity to influence the outcome. None of the listed countries in the world have the opportunity to change their position.
Thus, the Cold War in the Orwellian sense of the term remains the most important feature of world politics in the nuclear era. It is not at all surprising that in the case of the conflict between the US and Russia over Ukraine, the United States is guided by the very rules that it learned over the past decades.
First of all, the lack of responsibility for the fate of those who wage their proxy war. This is because the US does not connect its own security to the survival of its allies. As a result, it cannot fully anticipate the response of the opposing side to its actions.
Since proxies are not official representatives of their sponsor country, the government cannot be held legally responsible for their actions. Some observers have pointed out that some of the radical movements in Syria receive support from abroad, which has little effect on Russia’s relations with their sponsors.
China at one time actively used radical Marxist movements in the countries of Southeast Asia and provided them with various assistance. However, this was not a reason to enter a state of war for its relations with countries where such groups operated. The USSR also supported various rebel movements that acted against the United States and its allies.
But it did not consider this a reason for war. From the point of view of any ordinary state, the only reason for war with another state is direct aggression on its national territory. Perhaps this is why the United States does not currently believe that its actions in Ukraine could cause a direct conflict with Russia.
But it is still completely unknown to what extent such logic can work now, when the conflict is taking place in close proximity to the capital of the Russian state, and not in distant Afghanistan, for example. Moreover, the policy of NATO expansion over the past 30 years has created a number of opportunities for the United States which are also challenges for Russia.
After all, all the countries of the alliance in Europe, especially Eastern Europe, are perceived in Washington and Moscow as nothing more than American proxies, whose involvement in hostilities has little connection with the direct threat that Russia and the United States themselves can pose to each other. It is hardly worth mentioning what potential threats and shocks may contain a scenario based on such an assumption.
We also cannot discount the unclear connection between the foreign policy position of great powers and their internal stability. We see that a significant part of American nervousness about what is happening in the world is connected with the need to continue to benefit from the overall functioning of the global political and economic system.
It is not only difficult for the US to come to terms with changes here due to inertial thinking, but it may also be dangerous until the American establishment finds other effective ways to keep the situation inside the country under control. Moreover, the general crisis of the socio-economic system which has been created by the West since the mid-1970s is not going away; it is only gaining momentum. Yes, in general, the presence of colossal stockpiles of nuclear weapons in two or three great military powers reduces the likelihood of a general war in its traditional sense.
However, the state of “a world that will not be at peace” promised by the novelist also looks like it is balancing on the edge of something that would render any theoretical constructions meaningless.
