Trump’s tariffs strain U.S.-India Ties, pushing New Delhi closer to Moscow and Beijing

Department of Research, Studies and International News15-08-2025

When U.S. President Donald Trump meets Russian President Vladimir Putin in Alaska on Friday, the eyes of policymakers in New Delhi will be watching just as closely as those in Washington, Moscow, and European capitals. For India, the outcome could carry significant implications for its future diplomatic trajectory.

Since the Cold War’s end, India has carefully balanced its historically close partnership with Russia alongside steadily growing ties with the United States. Relations with Washington strengthened significantly under Presidents George W. Bush and Barack Obama, continued during Trump’s first term, and maintained momentum under Joe Biden. Central to this warmth was Washington’s expectation that New Delhi would serve as a counterweight to Beijing’s rising influence in the Asia-Pacific. The U.S. also integrated India into the Quad alliance alongside Japan and Australia, framing it as part of a shared strategic front.

However, those dynamics are shifting dramatically. Trump’s latest policy move, a sweeping 50% tariff on Indian imports, one of the harshest imposed on any country, has shocked Indian policymakers. Half of that penalty targets India’s continued purchase of Russian oil, a practice that Washington itself encouraged under Biden to stabilize global crude prices. Ironically, China, which imports even more Russian oil, has been spared such tariffs as Washington simultaneously pursues trade talks with Beijing.

This uneven treatment has fueled speculation that the U.S. may be deprioritizing its much-touted “pivot to Asia,” a strategic doctrine launched under Obama to counter China’s influence. For India, the immediate message is clear: Washington’s reliability as a partner is now in serious question.

From personal camaraderie to political rift

During Trump’s first term, he cultivated a public friendship with Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, appearing alongside him at large rallies and exchanging warm rhetoric. Yet this personal rapport did not shield New Delhi from punitive trade measures that rival those imposed on Brazil. Analysts note that the tariff decision marks the sharpest downturn in bilateral ties in decades.

Initially, India avoided public confrontation, but the tone has shifted. New Delhi has openly accused Washington of double standards, pointing out that the U.S. itself continues trading with Russia while penalizing India for doing the same. The erosion of trust is evident, and observers say personal frictions between Trump and Modi have deepened the crisis.

Historically, India has endured U.S. pressure over its defense ties with Moscow, notably during its purchase of S-400 missile systems. While the Biden administration granted a sanctions waiver in 2022, Trump’s transactional approach has left little space for strategic exceptions. His recent engagement with Pakistan’s military leadership has only amplified India’s wariness, reviving memories of Washington’s Cold War tilt toward Islamabad.

Questioning the “pivot”

The Obama-era “Rebalance to Asia” policy promised greater U.S. economic and military engagement in the Indo-Pacific. Yet under Trump, the trade pillar collapsed with the U.S. withdrawal from the Trans-Pacific Partnership in 2017. What remained was a heavily militarized approach, lacking the economic commitments that regional states sought.

Now, with Trump targeting India while seeking accommodation with Beijing, Asian partners are reassessing whether Washington still prioritizes regional alliance-building. For India, never a formal treaty ally of the U.S., the time may be ripe for recalibration.

Moscow, Beijing, and a multipolar vision

In recent weeks, New Delhi has intensified high-level engagement with Russia and China. National Security Adviser Ajit Doval met Putin in Moscow earlier this month, and Foreign Minister S. Jaishankar is set to visit soon. Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi is also expected in New Delhi, followed by Modi’s planned trip to China for the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation summit, his first visit there in seven years.

Russia has proposed reviving the Russia-India-China (RIC) trilateral platform, an initiative first formalized in 2002 but dormant in recent years. While India-China relations remain strained over unresolved border disputes, recent troop withdrawals and leader-level meetings have reduced immediate tensions.

Analysts caution that any RIC revival would be largely symbolic, given the complexity of India-China ties. Yet the very consideration of such a platform signals India’s willingness to diversify its strategic options and reduce dependence on Washington.

Domestic optics and strategic autonomy

For Modi, Trump’s hardline tactics may have unintended political benefits. They allow him to portray himself as standing firm against U.S. pressure, bolstering his nationalist credentials at home. Facing opposition criticism over his handling of Pakistan and ongoing farmer concerns, Modi has emphasized that he will not sacrifice India’s agricultural sector to appease foreign demands.

Still, this pursuit of “multi-alignment”, maintaining balanced ties with multiple powers, comes with risks. Further U.S. sanctions or tariffs could strain India’s economy, though the political cost of appearing to yield to Washington may be even higher for Modi.

Ultimately, both nations have incentives to prevent a complete breakdown. Yet the warmth and strategic trust that once defined the relationship may be absent for the foreseeable future. As the U.S. wavers in its Asian strategy, India’s deepening dialogue with Moscow and Beijing underscores an emerging reality: in an increasingly multipolar world, New Delhi will not place all its bets on Washington.