The Generation of Soft Wars and the Rise of the Coercion Policy

By Dr. Badra Gaaloul, President of the International Center for Strategic Security and Military Studies 06-09-2024

« The world today is gripped by an obsession with armament, major inventions, advanced military technology, and sophisticated weaponry. However, reality dictates its own rules and is steering us towards a new level of warfare, a transformation that marks a significant shift in human life, particularly in the context of global geopolitical changes. »

As the years go by, the power of military humanities and social sciences is once again asserting itself as a destructive and formidable weapon for control and occupation, achieving dominance with minimal material and human losses. Armed conflict and military warfare are no longer the first or most effective methods for resolving political conflicts. Even the most heavily armed powers have retreated from direct military intervention, opting instead to exhaust a new strategy: soft war. Among the most recent and sophisticated of these strategies is the “capacity for coercion,” a concept explored in a study by the RAND Corporation a research arm of the White House and Pentagon authored by David S. Gompert and Hans Binnendijk.

But what does this “capacity for coercion” entail?

For American strategists, coercion is about confronting the enemy without engaging in war. After an in-depth analysis of the escalating costs, risks, and public uncertainties surrounding the outcomes of war, the importance of America’s coercive power becomes evident. The tools employed in this strategy are crucial.

The three most effective and implicitly powerful tools available to the United States under this “capacity for coercion” are financial sanctions, support for nonviolent political opposition, and offensive cyber operations.

The RAND study also calls on the U.S. government to analyze the use of “coercive power” with the same rigor it applies to preparing for military wars, by assessing requirements, capabilities, simulating scenarios, and planning with allies to achieve American objectives.

But how can this strategy be applied politically?

Political pragmatism, often seen as the antithesis of the concept of coercion, is a theory in political philosophy that seeks to explain, formulate, and propose political relations. It posits that power is the primary goal of political action, whether on a local or international scale.

Domestically, this theory suggests that politicians strive, or should strive, to increase their power. Internationally, nation-states are viewed as the primary agents tasked with expanding their influence. At its core, political pragmatism asserts that whoever holds power holds the right.

Political realism assumes that interests are protected by the exercise of power and that the world is characterized by competing power dynamics. International policies mostly agree that states are power-connected agents and that it is necessary to use any means to preserve national interests.

With Donald Trump’s ascension to the White House, the RAND Corporation released a study titled “Capacity for Coercion: Confronting Enemies Without War.” This study outlines the real reasons why the United States remains at the pinnacle of the existing international order. It also highlights the necessity of adapting to the decreasing willingness of the U.S. to use aggressive military force while increasing its capacity for “coercion.”

Notably, the rhetoric of President Trump and his team in the White House, whether military, security, or political-echoes the themes from the RAND study “Capacity for Coercion: Confronting Enemies Without War,” especially the following revealing statistics:

– The United States holds the top spot with 30% of global foreign direct investment, significantly outpacing other countries.

– The dollar is the foundation of transactions in global banking and currency markets.

– Four of the seven largest banks in the world (by market value) are American.

– The top seven media companies globally, accounting for 95% of global media revenues, are American.

– The United States sells three-quarters of the world’s weapons and provides $18 billion in military aid, far surpassing any other nation.

– The majority of research and inventions driving global information networks are American.

– The United States leads or co-leads most of the world’s most important institutions, including those that control the global economy.

– The U.S. Navy’s dominance is comparable to that of the British Royal Navy in the 19th century, enabling it to enforce maritime control or blockades anywhere, effectively acting as the “global trade policeman.”

– U.S. intelligence capabilities are unmatched, influencing political decision-making among both allies and adversaries.

Researchers in the study argue that strengthening U.S. relations with European and Asian allies would significantly and effectively enable the application of the “coercion” theory. Experts and researchers believe this to be feasible, although not always successful, as these countries might awaken to the realization that American alliances are more about dominance and control than mutual interest, with the United States maintaining its position as the world’s leading power.

Between hard power, based on military confrontation, and soft power lies “coercion” a third type of power that involves using non-military means to pressure adversarial or competing states to comply with actions they would not normally agree to, considering their unique circumstances and societal contexts.

The reason American researchers propose the third option ; coercive power; is the demonstrated failures of military and soft power strategies. The U.S. has experienced significant material and moral costs with the first two options, making the third option—international maneuvering and “coercive power” the most likely to achieve American goals. The ability to adapt non-military actions, involving a range of escalating options, while creating maneuvering space on the international stage, will increase in importance in the future.

The “capacity for coercion,” combined with political savvy, can be realized through economic sanctions, general political measures, cyber operations, intelligence, military assistance, trade restrictions, and embargoes on individuals or goods. The study notes that all countries in the world can be subjected to “coercive power” except one, China. According to American analysts, China poses the strongest challenge to U.S. military options in a vital region.

The study also highlights China’s internal cohesion and strong political unity as significant advantages, along with its crucial role in global trade and finance. Additionally, China possesses its own coercive options, such as cyber capabilities and its holdings of U.S. debt. The study acknowledges the possibility of reciprocal actions and escalation, particularly with countries possessing “electronic warfare capabilities,” such as Russia and China.

The United States has developed non-military defensive means to punish and weaken those who threaten its interests and security as part of its “hard security” strategy. This approach enables the U.S. to achieve its objectives without firing a single shot or losing a soldier.

The study reveals that the U.S. increasingly faces opponents of its policies and interests through information wars, fourth-generation warfare, and economic wars, which are more damaging and less costly than military wars.

America’s new international policy is now transparent to global leaders and decision-makers, as the most viable options for coercing countries into compliance include financial and economic sanctions of varying severity. The most destructive option, however, is internal destabilization through support for nonviolent political opposition to hostile regimes and offensive cyber operations.

Notably, the U.S. support for opposition movements under the banner of democracy, particularly in the Arab world, poses a significant threat. Through social media, global media, local movements, and external supporters, this support wields considerable influence.

The RAND study, published in 2016, expressed concern about the potential failure of the “coercive power” strategy in some countries, stating, “Recent developments indicate a significant risk of repression or chaos, necessitating prudent use of this coercive tool.”

The study emphasizes that “offensive cyber operations,” when skillfully directed at a specific target, can undermine the performance and confidence of states and markets, making them a powerful coercive tool for achieving U.S. objectives. This policy of “coercive power” appears to be effective in both Arab and some Western and European countries.

The U.S. is now seeking advanced but non-military defensive capabilities. The study notes that while the U.S. has fought major wars successfully with minimal losses, the American public and military are no longer willing to tolerate any casualties, given their status as the world’s superpower.

The study adds that the development of defensive military capabilities by “potential enemies” is undermining the effectiveness of U.S. offensive capabilities, despite American military superiority. This is unacceptable to Americans, who are determined to maintain their position as a global power.

Thus, there is a growing focus on justifying non-military power options and the political strategies for U.S. “coercion,” forcing unfriendly states to comply with “American desires.” The study identifies China, Russia, and Iran as America’s potential adversaries.

The study further asserts that the U.S. has succeeded in changing regimes and intervening in major local conflicts, destroying “enemy” states, given that America has the power to obliterate all “hostile forces.” However, initial steps involve intense attacks deep within “enemy” territory using “coercive power” strategies, increasing the risk of escalation, particularly in the case of nuclear-armed countries like China and Russia.

The study also notes that “after spending the past 15 to 25 years at war, the U.S. is under pressure to reduce its reliance on military force to protect its interests, fulfill its responsibilities, address threats, and maintain order. At the same time, it faces pressure to alleviate the burden of defense to meet urgent domestic needs.”

The U.S. can create an environment conducive to its interests by coercing the enemy into submission using soft methods without resorting to military force, such as the threat of force, organizing “international isolation,” inflicting economic harm, supporting local opposition, influencing media, shaping perceptions, “twisting arms through diplomatic means,” and negotiating.

Soft power relies on influence, institutions, economic assistance, promoting democracy, cultural exchange, and spreading ideas, encouraging other societies to become more like “America” or at least more favorable to it.

This involves shaping the international environment, strengthening alliances, garnering global support, or promoting common values to isolate or marginalize the enemy. While not as effective as military action, it can achieve objectives with minimal costs, risks, and losses, often without war, and typically without bloodshed.

The study indicates that all countries, especially enemies and adversaries, are susceptible to infiltration. Thus, supporting opponents or opposition forces, and even engaging in proxy military confrontations if necessary, becomes crucial.

Supporting an enemy’s adversaries is the second mechanism of “coercive power.” The study notes that the United States “possesses various means to strengthen and support countries and groups that oppose its enemies. It can provide non-military or military assistance for this purpose, with the latter being considered the most frequent use of hard power by proxy.”

The study also mentions that the greatest coercive influence might stem from posing a threat to the political authority or even the survival of a regime that challenges U.S. interests. Additionally, the study highlights the sudden and frequent emergence of pro-democracy movements, partially attributed to modern means of social communication and political organization.

It further states that “new research covering the past century shows that well-planned, broad-based nonviolent movements are twice as likely to lead to stable democratic outcomes compared to violent movements.”

Regarding internal incitement, the study asserts, “Although local organization, protests, strikes, defections from the ruling regime, and other forms of resistance is more important than external support, it is also true that external support for nonviolent opposition movements is more likely to yield better results than supporting violent movements.”

The final part of the study states, “In any case, when intervening in the internal dynamics of other states and societies, whether justified or not, the United States must recognize the limits of its ability to control the outcomes.”

The study continues, “While nonviolent uprisings rely less on external support than violent ones, there is much that the United States and other capable and interested democracies can do to help, such as providing financial support to free press, attracting global media attention, condemning regime brutality, influencing discontented elites, facilitating the use of social media, and discouraging the use of violence, all of which are known to be effective measures.” This is precisely what U.S. foreign policy applies to Arab countries.

The study further notes, “As information becomes widespread and media globalized, societies become more capable of communication, even using the latest means, making most states susceptible to infiltration, except for the most isolated ones.

In these circumstances, opportunities to influence foreign politics will expand.” It adds, “Supporting internal opposition is a traditional tool used by intelligence agencies, intended to be deniable, not only because intelligence operations are typically denied but also because opposition movements lose credibility if linked to the CIA or British MI6.”

Concerning cyber operations, the study views this mechanism as the easiest for the National Security Agency (NSA), which excels in offensive actions. The third coercive mechanism is offensive cyber operations. The study mentions that “the United States is a cyber superpower.

It continues to invent most of the technologies that activate and expand this field and provides most of the content, whether it be information, applications, entertainment, news, debates, social communication, or ideas.” It adds, “The United States prefers that the center of cyberspace, which is the internet, remains open and secure.

The United States has unmatched surveillance, defense, and offensive capabilities in this area, although most American cyber capabilities are outside government control. The NSA possesses significant technical and operational capabilities, including advanced technology and means in cybersecurity and the ability to carry out offensive operations.”

The study continues, “Despite these capabilities, the U.S. government is cautious about waging cyber warfare.” It further notes, “On the tactical military level, cyber warfare is considered an integral part of combat and is planned accordingly.

However, the United States is highly averse to cyber warfare on a strategic level, where its primary infrastructure and economy could suffer significant, even if temporary, damage. It agrees with the idea that no one would win in a comprehensive cyber war.”

The study explains that “this aversion is further exacerbated by the lack of complete confidence in avoiding retaliation and controlling escalation from tactical to strategic levels of cyber warfare.” It adds, “Offensive cyber operations are less violent than physical force but more destructive than financial sanctions.

For example, these operations could allow the United States to degrade its enemies’ military power, intelligence systems, and sensitive government and civilian information networks that challenge U.S. interests and responsibilities. Although the cost of executing offensive cyber operations may be minimal, the economic repercussions can be severe.”

Thus, the U.S. strategy, while uncertain in its outcomes, can also be spectacular depending on the skill of the coercer and the vulnerability of the target. The study concludes that “these tools can bend policies, break wills, or loosen the grip of the targeted states on power.”

It also notes that U.S. intelligence capabilities influence decision-making processes among both friends and foes. The study adds, “The ability to coerce can deliver the results of victory without resorting to violence, but it can also go beyond coercion, such as toppling a hostile regime instead of merely pressuring it to become more moderate.”