A Decade After Brexit: Political Legitimacy, Sovereignty, and Lessons for Australia
By Amal Toukebri : Department of Research and Strategic Studies 15-10-2026
Ten years after the United Kingdom’s referendum on European Union membership, a growing share of British voters regard Brexit as a mistake. This reassessment raises broader questions about political representation, economic sovereignty, institutional trust, and the capacity of democratic governments to deliver long-term policy in an uncertain international order.
Promises of Control and the Reality of Governance
The United Kingdom’s decision to leave the European Union remains one of the most consequential political developments in contemporary Europe. Its advocates presented Brexit as a means of restoring parliamentary sovereignty, reclaiming control over borders and regulation, and renewing democratic accountability. Yet, a decade after the 2016 referendum, public opinion has shifted markedly.
In May 2026, polling commissioned by the European Council on Foreign Relations and conducted with Mandate Research and YouGov found that 57 per cent of British respondents believed it had been wrong for the United Kingdom to leave the EU, while 30 per cent still considered the decision correct. Two-thirds of respondents also believed Brexit had negatively affected the economy and contributed to a higher cost of living. Comparable YouGov tracking indicates that the proportion viewing Brexit as the wrong decision has remained above 50 per cent since 2022.
These findings should not be interpreted as evidence that public opinion has become uniformly pro-EU or that all former Leave supporters now favour re-entry. Rather, they indicate a widening gap between the expectations generated during the referendum campaign and the outcomes many citizens associate with withdrawal. The central issue is therefore not merely whether Brexit has produced measurable economic losses, but whether democratic institutions can sustain legitimacy when major political projects fail to deliver the benefits promised to their supporters.
The British case also offers a comparative lens for Australia. Although Australia has not experienced a comparable constitutional or geopolitical rupture, it faces related pressures: declining attachment to major parties, rising electoral volatility, contested immigration policy, and a more demanding strategic environment in the Indo-Pacific. The lesson is not that Brexit predicts Australia’s future, but that sovereignty, public trust, institutional capacity, and strategic power are mutually dependent.
Brexit and the Limits of Economic Sovereignty
The economic consequences of Brexit remain central to assessments of its long-term significance. Withdrawal altered the conditions under which British firms trade with the European Union, their largest trading partner, by introducing customs procedures, regulatory divergence, and non-tariff barriers. These changes have affected trade flows, investment decisions, labour mobility, and supply-chain organisation.
The UK House of Commons Library summarises the scholarly consensus as follows: estimates generally suggest that UK GDP is between 2 and 8 per cent lower than it would have been had the country remained in the EU. The Office for Budget Responsibility continues to assume that Brexit will reduce long-run productivity, and therefore GDP, by approximately 4 per cent relative to a counterfactual in which the UK had remained an EU member.
This evidence requires careful interpretation. The figures do not mean that the UK economy has contracted by 4 per cent since 2016; rather, they estimate a difference between observed performance and a hypothetical scenario of continued EU membership. The post-referendum period has also been shaped by the COVID-19 pandemic, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, energy-price shocks, inflation, and domestic policy constraints. Precise attribution is therefore difficult.
Nevertheless, the balance of evidence points to persistent costs arising from trade friction, weaker business investment, and reduced productivity growth. Brexit granted the UK formal autonomy over trade policy and regulation, but that autonomy has not clearly compensated for the loss of privileged access to the European single market. The case illustrates an important distinction between formal sovereignty and effective economic capacity: a state may regain legal authority over its rules while simultaneously facing higher transaction costs and reduced influence over the regulatory environment in which its firms operate.
For democratic politics, the implication is significant. Sovereignty acquires political value only when citizens experience it as improved security, prosperity, or institutional effectiveness. Where the promised benefits of autonomy fail to materialise, dissatisfaction may extend beyond a particular policy to the political system that authorised and implemented it.
Representation, Distrust, and Populist Mobilisation
Reducing Brexit to hostility towards immigration or European integration would produce an incomplete explanation of the referendum. Immigration, national identity, and border control were undeniably central to the campaign. However, the Leave vote also expressed dissatisfaction with political elites, perceptions of democratic distance, regional inequality, and a demand for greater national control.
The slogan “Take Back Control” was politically effective because it condensed multiple grievances into a single narrative: that important decisions had become detached from the citizens expected to live with their consequences. This dynamic can be understood through Peter Mair’s argument in Ruling the Void that established parties have become increasingly detached from their social bases, weakening the representative link between citizens and democratic institutions (Mair, 2013). Colin Crouch’s concept of “post-democracy” similarly highlights the risk that formal democratic procedures may persist while substantive influence becomes concentrated among political professionals and organised economic interests (Crouch, 2004).
These perspectives help explain why distrust can deepen even in societies with competitive elections, civil liberties, and established constitutional safeguards. Democratic legitimacy depends not only on the existence of elections but also on citizens’ belief that participation can meaningfully shape collective decisions.
Populist movements often mobilise such dissatisfaction by constructing a moral division between a supposedly homogeneous “people” and a self-interested “elite.” Cas Mudde defines populism as a thin-centred ideology that considers society ultimately separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups: “the pure people” and “the corrupt elite” (Mudde, 2004). This framing can make complex institutional and economic problems appear as a straightforward struggle for political control.
Yet Brexit cannot be reduced to populism alone. Leave voters held diverse views on immigration, economic policy, sovereignty, and the future of European integration. The more consequential development was the weakening of institutions capable of mediating competing interests. When established parties lose credibility, electoral discontent may take the form of protest voting, party fragmentation, and demands for abrupt institutional change. Brexit demonstrates how such pressures can culminate in a decision whose consequences extend well beyond a single electoral cycle.
Political Fragmentation and the Australian Democratic Challenge
The British experience offers a useful comparative framework for Australia, where major parties also face weakening partisan attachments, more volatile electoral behaviour, and increasing competition from independents and minor parties.
At the 2022 Australian federal election, the combined primary vote for Labor and the Coalition fell to 68.3 per cent, the lowest since the 1930s. The Australian Election Study also found that only 37 per cent of voters reported always voting for the same party, down from 72 per cent in 1967. The election of a record number of independents and minor-party representatives reflected not simply protest, but also changing policy priorities, especially around climate change, integrity, gender equality, and regional representation.
This fragmentation does not necessarily signify democratic decline. Greater electoral competition can improve representation by enabling citizens to punish unresponsive parties and place neglected issues on the parliamentary agenda. Independent candidates and minor parties may enrich deliberation and force major parties to respond to constituencies they have overlooked.
The difficulty arises when fragmentation makes it harder to build durable agreements on long-term priorities such as economic reform, housing, energy transition, infrastructure, and defence. A government may command a parliamentary majority without winning a majority of first-preference votes; conversely, minority or negotiated government is not inherently weak. The central distinction is between a political system that accommodates pluralism while retaining the capacity to act, and one in which short-term electoral pressures repeatedly obstruct coherent policymaking.
Public consultation, royal commissions, and expert inquiries can strengthen legitimacy by improving transparency and incorporating specialised knowledge into policymaking. However, they become problematic when governments use prolonged consultation to defer difficult decisions or shift responsibility away from elected representatives. Australia’s challenge is therefore not to restore the dominance of the two major parties, but to build institutions capable of representing changing public interests while preserving accountability, continuity, and governing capacity.
Domestic Legitimacy and Australia’s Strategic Future
The relationship between domestic political cohesion and international power is increasingly important as Australia’s strategic environment becomes more contested. The Indo-Pacific is shaped by China’s growing economic and military capabilities, the continuing centrality of the United States alliance, and the rising importance of regional powers including Indonesia, India, Japan, and South Korea.
Australia’s recent defence planning reflects this shifting environment. The 2023 Defence Strategic Review, the 2024 National Defence Strategy, and the 2026 National Defence Strategy all emphasise the need to focus Australian defence policy on Indo-Pacific contingencies, while increasing investment in long-range capabilities, domestic industry, and resilience. These priorities cannot be achieved through foreign-policy declarations alone. They require sustained public funding, industrial capacity, technological development, workforce planning, and political consensus across electoral cycles.
From a realist perspective in international relations, states must maintain sufficient material capabilities to protect their interests in a competitive international system. Yet material resources do not automatically translate into strategic effectiveness. Economic productivity, technological capacity, institutional competence, social cohesion, and political stability all shape a state’s ability to mobilise power.
It would be inaccurate to claim that Australia already faces a future without a powerful ally. The United States alliance remains central to Australian security policy. A more defensible argument is that Canberra must prepare for greater uncertainty regarding the durability and predictability of American strategic commitments, shifts in the regional balance of power, and the possibility that Australia will need to assume greater responsibility for its own defence.
This does not imply strategic isolation or abandonment of alliances. Rather, it underscores the need for Australia to develop sufficient capability to contribute meaningfully to partnerships, withstand coercion, and preserve strategic choice. Domestic political fragmentation can complicate this task when governments struggle to sustain support for defence expenditure, industrial policy, or reforms whose benefits emerge only over several electoral cycles.
Brexit therefore offers Australia a broader lesson: strategic autonomy depends partly on domestic institutional strength. A country may possess substantial economic and military resources but struggle to mobilise them effectively if its political system cannot sustain public confidence or establish a coherent national direction.
Immigration, Identity, and the Politics of Discontent
Immigration illustrates how economic pressure, national identity, and political representation intersect in contemporary democracies. In Britain, immigration became closely associated with the Brexit debate through arguments about border control, free movement, labour competition, and the authority of European institutions. Yet the relationship between immigration and the referendum result was complex. Voters were also motivated by sovereignty, regional inequality, deindustrialisation, and distrust of the political establishment.
Comparable tensions exist in Australia, where immigration policy intersects with labour-market needs, demographic change, housing affordability, infrastructure capacity, and public-service provision. These issues require analytical precision. Immigration can support economic growth, address skills shortages, and contribute to demographic sustainability. At the same time, rapid population growth can intensify pressure on housing and infrastructure when planning, transport, and public investment fail to keep pace.
The distributional effects of migration are especially important. The benefits and costs of immigration are not experienced evenly across regions, income groups, or generations. A sustainable policy must therefore combine credible migration management with investment in housing, infrastructure, education, health services, and integration programmes.
When governments respond to electoral pressure by adopting increasingly restrictive rhetoric, they may be responding to genuine public concerns. However, restrictive immigration policy alone cannot resolve structural problems related to housing supply, productivity, wage growth, or public-service
capacity. The danger arises when complex socioeconomic challenges are reduced to a single explanation centred on migrants. Such framing can obscure the role of domestic policy choices, planning failures, and broader economic conditions in generating public dissatisfaction.
For established parties, the challenge is to address public concerns without allowing electoral competition to displace evidence-based analysis. Democratic credibility depends partly on the capacity to distinguish between the political appeal of an explanation and the empirical evidence required to support it.
Beyond Brexit: Rebuilding Democratic and Strategic Capacity
The growing number of Britons who regard Brexit as a mistake should not be read as proof that every consequence of withdrawal has been negative, or that all Leave supporters have abandoned their original convictions. Public attitudes remain diverse, and regret over Brexit’s outcomes does not automatically translate into support for immediate EU membership.
Nevertheless, the changing debate suggests that democratic legitimacy cannot be assessed solely through the result of the 2016 referendum. Legitimacy is an ongoing relationship between institutions and citizens, shaped by policy performance, accountability, transparency, and the capacity of governments to respond to changing circumstances.
Recent parliamentary analysis of UK–EU relations reflects this continuing tension. While the economic costs of withdrawal remain substantial, the UK has also pursued independent trade agreements and sought to exercise regulatory autonomy in selected sectors. The central question is whether these gains outweigh the costs of reduced integration, and whether closer cooperation with Europe could improve Britain’s economic resilience and strategic position.
For Australia, the implications extend beyond the fortunes of the major parties. Democratic renewal requires institutions that can maintain public confidence without sacrificing the ability to make difficult decisions. It also requires a willingness to address structural problems—productivity, housing, energy, education, technological capacity, and defence preparedness—rather than relying on symbolic promises of national restoration.
A credible reform agenda would link these domains. It would recognise that economic resilience, social cohesion, and strategic capacity are interconnected. It would also seek durable foreign-policy and defence arrangements capable of surviving changes of government.
Such an agenda does not require the elimination of political disagreement. Democratic pluralism is compatible with strategic continuity when institutions provide effective mechanisms for negotiation, accountability, and compromise.
Sovereignty Without Capacity, Legitimacy Without Trust
Brexit demonstrates that the recovery of formal national sovereignty does not automatically produce greater prosperity, more effective governance, or stronger international influence. The referendum emerged from a combination of political distrust, competing conceptions of national identity, regional inequality, and dissatisfaction with established institutions. Its subsequent consequences have led a growing number of Britons to question whether the promised benefits justified the costs.
The significance of Brexit lies not in treating it as a universal model of democratic failure, but in understanding the conditions under which political promises become disconnected from policy outcomes. When governments fail to translate demands for control into tangible improvements in public welfare, disappointment can deepen distrust and intensify political fragmentation.
For Australia, the lesson is especially relevant to the relationship between domestic governance and strategic autonomy. An increasingly uncertain Indo-Pacific environment requires economic resilience, credible defence capability, effective diplomacy, and sustained public support. These objectives become harder to achieve when political institutions cannot maintain trust or establish a coherent direction across electoral cycles.
Ultimately, national sovereignty is meaningful not merely because it grants a state authority to make decisions, but because it enables that state to act effectively. Democratic legitimacy, in turn, depends not only on electoral victory but on the continuing capacity of institutions to represent citizens, justify decisions, and deliver public value.
The central lesson of Brexit is that sovereignty, legitimacy, and national power are interconnected, but none can substitute for the others. A democracy may reclaim formal authority while remaining economically constrained; it may hold competitive elections while experiencing a crisis of representation; and it may possess substantial strategic resources while struggling to mobilise them effectively. The long-term challenge for democratic governments is to reconcile popular demands with institutional capacity, economic realities, and the strategic requirements of an interdependent world.
References
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- House of Commons Library. (2026, August 18). Debate on impact of the 2016 EU membership referendum on the UK (Research Briefing CBP-10988). UK Parliament.
- Mair, P. (2013). Ruling the void: The hollowing of Western democracy. Verso.
- McAllister, I. (2023). The 2022 Australian federal election: Results and implications. Australian Journal of Political Science, 58(3), 305–323.
- Mudde, C. (2004). The populist zeitgeist. Government and Opposition, 39(4), 541–563.
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