North Korea’s strategic play in an era of great .power confrontation

Department of Research, Strategic Studies 06/01/2026

North Korea’s arms transfer to Russia deepens defence ties and open economic lifelines, while a reset with China has stabilised relations without closing differences on denuclearisation. The triangle is one of convenience, undermined by mutual mistrust and China’s global economic calculus. In Washington, options have narrowed as US President Donald Trump signals openness to renewed summitry and South Korea pursues a nuclear freeze approach. A nuclear arms control deal looks increasingly possible, risking de facto legitimation of North Korea’s nuclear status.

North Korea’s relations with Russia were relatively amicable, albeit limited, in the first decade of Kim Jong-un’s leadership. In 2012, Russian President Vladimir Putin  demonstrated goodwilltowards the fledgling Kim regime by writing off 90 per cent of North Korea’s Soviet-era debt and launched infrastructure projects to enhance cooperation with North and South Korea. In 2014 and 2015, there was a brief rapprpchmentsas Pyongyang and Moscow had -high level official goverment engagement  and reached investment agreements to modernise North Korea’s transportation infrastructure.

The outbreak of the Russia–Ukraine war in 2022 was a major inflection point in North Korea’s foreign relations. Before the war, Pyongyang had been grappling with internal and external setbacks . After severe economic hardship from its self-imposed three-year border closure due to COVID-19, the Russia–Ukraine war provided an opportunity for Kim to draw Russia closer,  vetoing the UN resolution  that condemned Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and  recognising Russia’s occupation of Donetsk and Luhansk. Moscow welcomed Pyongyang’s support, callong for  the expansion of ‘comprehensive and constructive bilateral relations’.

Bilateral military cooperation deepened as Russia faced ammunition shortages, with North Korea delivering millions of artillery shells to Russia.

Economic ties also deepened, with Russia supplying food, energy and hard cash for North Korean workers. In March 2024, Russia further undermined the UN’s ability to enforce sanctions on North Korea by vetoing the UN resolution to renew the panel of experts monitoring sanctions. This international legitimation of North Korea’s nuclear status also reduced the need for dialogue with the United States, which Kim had sought to engage for sanction relief in 2016 and 2017.

North Korea’s strategic partnership with Russia, combined with Trump’s return to the White House and diplomatic with kim, led to a diplomatic opening in China–North Korea relations in September 2025. Chinese President Xi invited Kim to China’s Victory Day parade and accorded him special treatment by placing him second in the protocol order, immediately after Putin. Xi and Kim held their first summit since 2019 and North Korean Foreign Minister Choe Son-hui  visited china in late September 2025.

Any form of trilateral partnership continues to be constrained by mutual mistrust and diverging interests, with China hesitant to cast its lot with its sanctioned North Korean and Russian counterparts. China has consistently opposed accepting North Korea as a nuclear power, but the lack of outright condemnation and calls for denuclearisation suggest Beijing may now view denuclearisation as unattainable.

Russia’s war in Ukraine and intensifying US–China competition have left Washington with few practical policy options to pressure North Korea into denuclearisation. Against this backdrop, Donald Trump’s return has revived the prospects for Kim–Trump summit diplomacy 2.0. In January 2025, Trump called North Korea a ‘ nuclear power’ and has continued to extend an olive branch for dialogue. In late September, Kim Jong-un publicly expressed his openness to another meeting with the United States provided it dropped its denuclearisation demand — a sharp contrast with Pyongyang’s radio silence during the Biden administration.