Adopting Multi-Vector Foreign Policy: A Strategic Reorientation for Middle Powers in the MENA Region

By Mahmoud M. Abdallah: Department of Research, Strategic Studies and International Relations 25-12-2025

I. History, Definition, and the Emergence of Multi-Alignments’ Strategies

The current balance of power of the international system is currently traversing a period of profound structural alignment, marked by a steady transition from a US dominated ‘’Unipolar’’ order to a more fragmented ‘’Multipolar’’ one. The Middle East and North Africa (MENA) emerged as an example for the adoption of a Multi-Vector Foreign Policy (MVFP). The latter doctrine used to describe ‘’a foreign policy that develops foreign relations through a framework based on a pragmatic non-ideological foundation’’^[1]. In other words, it is defined by a state’s pursuit of balanced and cooperative relations with multiple global power, who might be adopting contrasting world views and ideologies, simultaneously to maximise their national interests and minimise dependency on a single global power.

In the MENA region, multi-vector foreign policy is not just a niche diplomatic preference, rather, a strategic necessity. States are moving from ‘’block-based’’ alignments to ‘’issue-based’’ and multi-aligned strategies which prioritise national interests and tailor a foreign policy that fits multiple international actors. Historically, the term ‘’multi-vectorism’’ originated in the post-Soviet era in the early 1990s for newly independent states such as Kazakhstan^[2] and it is now sophisticated and adopted by MENA middle powers such as Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Qatar, and UAE. In contemporary international relations discourse, this foreign policy is viewed through strategic hedging and unlike traditional non-alignment that was apparent during the Cold War which often sought insulation from great-power rivalries and adopting one ideological or political stance over the other, multi-vectorism on the other hand requires persistent engagement with multiple actors so that the adopting states become an irreplaceable node in the global network.

II. The Changing Global Balance of Power: The Growing Multilateral Frameworks

            The international system has witnessed an evolution reflected in the growth of alternative multilateral frameworks such as the BRICS+ and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO). The rise of such establishments does fit into the broader trend of ‘’sovereignisation’’ in the foreign policies of the Global South states, in other words, it represents a model where national priorities outweigh collective ideology or a Western-led rules-based order^[3]. In that sense, for the MENA region, it manifested as a conflict-peaceful development dichotomy: meaning that while the region’s states may witness regional geopolitical instability, they are tandemly driving a focus on sustainable development that necessitates diversified international partnerships that lessens their reliance on the US-dollar dominated system^[4][5].

While the US still is a preeminent power, it now finds itself in a polarising world order that encompasses opposing visions of international order, moreover, the current Trump administration with its more transactional and so-called neo-protectionist policies has allowed more leverage for states like China, Russia, and India to expand their regional and global influence. The 2025 National Security Strategy (NSS) of Trump’s administration has institutionalised this shift and showed the transactional nature of the current approach and foreign policy which explicitly treats trade, tariffs, and industrial capacity as the core national security tools.

The America First doctrine does put the values-based multilateralism or global democracy promotion in a less prioritised position than it used to be. In turn, the rise of China as a strategic partner, particularly in its developmental aid policies towards the MENA region i.e., the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and Russia’s ‘’Security Matrix’’ model offer the MENA states alternative poles of support that do not carry the same normative strings correlated with Western, mainly US, aid.

III. The Resilient Middle Power: Egypt Pursuit of Balance and Adoption of Multi-Vectorism

            Egypt’s transition to multi-vector foreign policy is rooted in its role as a central anchor in the region where it carries strategic advantages due to several structural factors such as: its rich historical legacy, demographic weight, geographic location, military power, and its cultural influence. These characteristics provided Cairo with a significant capacity for regional influence which gives it the leverage to maintain agency in the shifting global power dynamics^[6]. Consequently, the current foreign policy doctrine seeks to adopt an in medio stat virtus stance that reduce exclusive reliance on any single power and diversifies its alliances and partnerships. Simply put, this approach grounds the Egyptian diplomacy in regional priorities and strategic partnerships that elevates its interests and tackles economic and geopolitical challenges accordingly.

The Mechanisms of Multi-Vector Foreign Policy and Niche Diplomacy in Egyptian Statecraft:

1. A) Becoming an Active Partner in BRICS+ (Economic Multipolarity): Egypt’s role significantly improved in 2024 and 2025 in the BRICS+ as its accession is not merely symbolic rather has enabled the Central Bank of Egypt (CBE) to expand currency swap agreements with China, Russia, and India with over one-third of trade now settled in local currencies. In that sense, decoupling from the dollar, or in other words ‘’de-dollarisation’’, became a set strategy to reduce reliance on US-led financial architecture
2. B) The Energy Hub Strategy (El Dabaa Nuclear Project as a Milestone): El Dabaa Nuclear Project (NPP) which is developed in collaboration with the Russian Rosatom, is considered one of the largest projects in the Russian-Egyptian cooperation^[7]. This is not a mere energy-generating project, it also highlights the vital work of the Russian Industrial Zone (RIZ) within the Suez Canal Economic Zone (SCZONE) which reflects land-use and Egypt’s support to catalyse Russian industrial localisation and mutual cooperation. This demonstrates Egypt’s ‘’Eurasian Vector’’ as a tangible reality although it still carries strong ties with the ‘’American Vector’’ as well.
3. C) Mediation and Regional Geopolitical Stability: As an indispensable mediator in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the Libyan civil war, and the Sudanese crisis, Egypt ensures that its role is crucial and its stability is part and parcel of maintaining a level of stability in the region. For instance, in the Israeli-Hamas conflict Egypt positioned itself as a primary architect for carrying out the regional peace plans, most recently Trump 20-points Peace Plan. It utilises ‘’Strategic Deterrence’’ to halt military and armed escalations in the region.

By the same token, for the conflict in Libya, Egypt advocates for a Libyan-Libyan solution and the withdrawal of all foreign interventions to ensure a stable transition from the current civil war to a more stable unified Libya which entails negotiations between the disagreeing parties for conflict resolution.

1. Conclusion and Future Outlook

            The rise of multi-vectorism is a defining characteristic of the changing balance of power to a more multi-polar order which created a leeway for middle powers to achieve further strategic autonomy and maximise their development goals. This two-legged proactive approach can be briefly summarised as an approach to reduces reliance on a single power while maintaining cooperative ties with different states.

Nonetheless, as the international system becomes more fragmented and transaction, the cost of maintaining this foreign policy with multiple vectors e.g., Chinese Vector, American Vector, Russian Vector, and European becomes more challenging. Therefore, the success of the states adopting this foreign policy will depend on their ability to:

• Maintain political and social cohesion that resists external influences that carry contrasting stances^[8].
• Rebalancing the economic trade deficits and asymmetries with Eastern partners (mostly Chinese vector)^[9].
• Leveraging institutional platforms such as BRICS+ and SCO without alienating other Western partners and international institutions.

Hereafter, one question may be whether this will lead to a proxy competition which is a vital high-risk, high-reward gambit that states need to carry on with a robust political acumen that ensures that these states are no longer recipients of history, rather, its authors.

———————–

^[1] Reuel Hanks, ‘“Multi-Vector Politics” and Kazakhstan’s Emerging Role as a Geo-Strategic Player in Central Asia’, Oklahoma State University 11, no. 3 (2009): 257–67, https://doi.org/10.1080/19448950903152110.

^[2] Hanks, ‘“Multi-Vector Politics” and Kazakhstan’s Emerging Role as a Geo-Strategic Player in Central Asia’.

^[3] Jesse Weinberg et al., ‘The Relevance of the BRICS in Trump’s New World Order and Its Impact on Middle Eastern Multi-Alignment Strategies’, 17 December 2025, https://www.freiheit.org/relevance-brics-trumps-new-world-order-and-its-impact-middle-eastern-multi-alignment-strategies.

^[4] Serhat Çubukçuoğlu, ‘Türkiye and BRICS+: Strategic Ambitions in a Shifting Global Order’, 31 August 2025, https://trendsresearch.org/insight/turkiye-and-brics-strategic-ambitions-in-a-shifting-global-order/.

^[5] Igor A. Matveev, ‘Post-Bipolar Middle East: Moving from Conflicts to Sustainable Development in an Emerging Multipolar World’, Vestnik RUDN. International Relations 25, no. 3 (2025): 449–68, https://doi.org/10.22363/2313-0660-2025-25-3-449-468.

^[6] Mordechai Chaziza and Carmela Lutmar, ‘Between Constraint and Opportunity: Egypt’s Niche Diplomacy in a Shifting Global Order’, World 6, no. 4 (2025): 138, https://doi.org/10.3390/world6040138.

^[7] Amr Kandil, ‘Egypt, Russia Celebrate Progress at El Dabaa Nuclear Plant: What You Need to Know’, 19 November 2025, https://www.egypttoday.com/Article/1/143570/Egypt-Russia-celebrate-progress-at-El-Dabaa-Nuclear-Plant-What.

^[8] Murad Nasibov, The Limits of Central Asia’s Multi-Vector Foreign Policy, September 2025, https://hagueresearch.org/the-limits-of-central-asias-multi-vector-foreign-policy/.

^[9] Çubukçuoğlu, ‘Türkiye and BRICS+’.

————————-

Mahmoud M. Abdallah is a Researcher at the Centre for Global Affairs (CGA) at Badr University. His research interests are in International Relations and Politics of Great Power Competition, Public Policy, and Political Economy of Development.