After Israel’s attack on Qatar, prospect of strike on Houthis in Oman rises

By Giorgio Cafiero: Department of Research, Strategic Studies and International Relations 24-11-2025

 Qatari officials long regarded the presence of US Central Command’s forward headquarters at its Al-Udeid Air Base as ironclad protection against an attack by foreign adversaries. Yet, Israel’s unprecedented targeting of Palestinian Hamas officials in Doha in September shattered that perception and greatly undermined all Gulf Arab states’ confidence in the US security umbrella.

Oman—like Qatar long recognized as a key regional mediator—now views Israel as even more of a rogue and dangerous actor, highlighting how Gulf monarchies that were never confrontational actors in the Arab-Israeli conflict feel increasingly vulnerable to Israeli aggression.

Oman’s solidarity and diplomatic response

Having consistently condemned Israeli military operations elsewhere in the region, Muscat’s response to the Doha strike was in keeping with its longstanding diplomatic posture. The Sultanate also voiced opposition to the joint American-British strikes on Yemen during 2024–25 as well as Iran’s June 2025 missile attack on Al-Udeid Air Base, reflecting a broader commitment to regional stability and resistance to the normalization of force as a foreign policy tool.

Both Omani officials and ordinary citizens strongly support Qatar’s security and sovereignty as a fellow Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) member state. Reflecting this sentiment, Oman’s foreign ministry swiftly condemned the Israeli attack, a response widely covered in regional and international media.

The Doha bombing was “taboo-breaking” because it was the first Israeli attack on a GCC state, Dr. Abdullah Baabood, an Omani scholar and Visiting Professor at Waseda University in Tokyo, told Amwaj.media. The incident has deeply influenced Muscat’s evolving threat perceptions, with far-reaching implications for its approach to Gulf security and future regional mediation efforts.

“Even carefully mediated, neutral Gulf space is not immune to kinetic operations; sovereignty and mediation hubs can become vulnerable targets so neutrality [and] mediation are assets but not guarantees of physical safety,” an Omani analyst who preferred that his name be withheld explained when asked about the main lessons that Muscat has learned from the Israeli attack.

Although no formal polling exists, Baabood said he has observed widespread public outrage and solidarity with Qatar among Omanis on social media. This anger reflects deeper anxieties and growing doubts in Oman about the US security umbrella.

Although the Sultanate was not actively pursuing normalization with Israel prior to the Sept. 9 strike on Doha, the bombing has further distanced Muscat from any consideration of joining the Abraham Accords. “There is a strong belief that Israel is a rogue, ideologically driven, and dangerous state,” Baabood told Amwaj.media, emphasizing that “any idea of trying to make peace with a country led by a right-wing extremist government is not on the table for now.”

This point was reinforced by the language employed by Oman’s foreign minister, Sayyid Badr Albusaidi, at the Manama Dialogue earlier this month. Rebuking Tel Aviv, the top diplomat stated, “we have long known that Israel, not Iran, is the prime source of insecurity in the region.”

A potential future target?

In the aftermath of the targeting of Hamas officials in Doha, officials in Muscat can no longer dismiss the possibility of an Israeli strike against the Sultanate. Given that Israel views Yemen’s Ansarullah movement—better known as the Houthis—as a “terrorist” organization, there are concerns that Tel Aviv might target Houthi representatives in Oman. This line of reasoning requires Omani policymakers to confront difficult questions concerning the potential for future escalation and the erosion of traditional norms respecting Gulf Arab sovereignty.

“Oman has reason to be worried, and should monitor key indicators closely,” said the Omani analyst. Meanwhile, Baabood identified three key factors which he views as decreasing the risk of the Sultanate becoming a target.

First, the Omani scholar explained, the Israeli attack on Doha was met with unanimous condemnation across the region, signaling broad regional opposition to such actions. Second, the United States expressed clear displeasure with Israel’s decision, suggesting limits to Washington’s tolerance for unilateral escalation. Third, Oman’s longstanding role as a host for sensitive dialogue and backchannel diplomacy positions it uniquely in regional affairs. The latter, Baabood argued, provides Muscat with a degree of insulation—even from hardline elements in Israel and the United States, who, despite occasional criticism of Oman’s ties to the Houthis and its pragmatic relationship with Tehran, generally recognize the strategic value of its neutral posture.

Nonetheless, the risk of a potential Israeli attack in the future is heightened by the danger of potential disinformation campaigns being waged against Muscat. “Public claims that Houthi figures based in Muscat are directing or approving external attacks” would increase the possibility of such a scenario, the Omani analyst asserted, adding that “any public statements threatening to ‘eliminate’ external safe havens [or] evidence of a pattern of strikes moving beyond Yemen and into Gulf capitals” would be alarming from Muscat’s perspective. The analyst warned that “Oman should watch these signals and harden protective measures around mediation sites.”

Regardless of the magnitude of the risk of an Israeli strike, the leadership in Muscat will seek to “deter any [Israeli] adventurism” by keeping “Houthi channels quiet and controlled,” tightening security at home and working to “coordinate closely with friendly capitals,” noted Baabood.

Further diversification of security partnerships

Alongside strengthening the GCC’s collective defense, especially air defense, Oman will likely diversify its security partnerships beyond traditional reliance on Washington. However, Muscat will remain careful to avoid aligning too closely with any single geopolitical bloc.

“Oman’s longstanding foreign policy neutrality, mediation, balanced ties with Iran and the west will temper any dramatic shift. Oman will avoid moves that compromise its mediator role or force clear alignment against any major regional player,” the Omani analyst predicted.

Consistent with its longstanding foreign policy tradition, Oman’s approach to security diversification is best understood as a form of pragmatic hedging while navigating an increasingly multipolar world in a manner that preserves strategic autonomy.

In practical terms, Oman is likely to look to Turkey, Britain and France for enhanced cooperation on maritime security, air defense and training as well as intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR). This approach aligns with Muscat’s existing strong ties with Ankara, London and Paris, which are important players in Gulf Arab security architecture.

On Oct. 22, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan arrived in Oman at the end of a three-nation tour of the Gulf. While in Muscat, he oversaw the signing of several memoranda of understanding that expanded bilateral cooperation across a range of sectors, most notably in military affairs and the defense industry. For the Sultanate, these agreements represent a natural progression, underscoring a growing willingness to look to Ankara as a key partner in strengthening defense capabilities.

While Oman does not intend to replace the US as its primary security guarantor, Muscat could increasingly engage with China for diplomatic balance and cooperation on dual-use technologies. Meanwhile, despite its historically close relations with South Asia, the Sultanate is unlikely to mirror Saudi Arabia in entering a mutual defense agreement with Pakistan. There are special dimensions to the Pakistani-Saudi alliance which Muscat simply does not enjoy in its relationship with Islamabad. Furthermore, Oman has long avoided formal mutual defense treaties to preserve its geopolitical neutrality and maintain its longstanding “friends to all” foreign policy orientation.

“If Oman hedges, it is likelier via MoUs, intelligence sharing, and capacity-building, not a treaty that binds it to third-party conflicts,” Baabood told Amwaj.media.

Navigating a new Gulf security paradigm

Ultimately, Israel’s attack on a GCC member state has been a profound shock that fundamentally challenges longstanding assumptions about Washington’s security commitments to the Gulf monarchies. For Oman—renowned for its distinctive role as a neutral mediator—the circumstances surrounding the Israeli missile strike on Doha have been deeply unsettling.

Oman’s key takeaway is that Israel no longer regards America’s Gulf Arab allies as immune from its military operations in the region, and that, ultimately, no Gulf state can fully rely on the US security umbrella. Looking ahead, Oman’s central challenge will therefore be to preserve its distinctive foreign policy approach—rooted in the core principles of neutrality and mediation—while simultaneously adapting to the new and evolving security dynamics in the region.

Giorgio Cafiero: is the CEO of Gulf State Analytics , a Washington-based geopolitical risk consultancy.