By Mahmoud M. Abdallah: Department of Strategic Research, Studies and International Relations 30-10-2025

I. A Security and Political Collapse

Since the commencement of the intensified conflict on the 7^th of October 2023, the Gaza strip witnessed a fracture of its security space characterized by a multi-actor contest for control. The factions that appeared varied in their political alignments that ranged from opportunistic criminal-political militias to traditional clans. As a consequence, navigating these groups’ emergence is crucial to understanding how the future governance of the Gaza strip is going to be especially after the ceasefire agreement taking into effect, at least theoretically, on the 10^th of October.

The conflict is tripolar meaning it comprises three involved factions that are Hamas, external actors leveraging proxy militias, and clans from within Gaza. These groups, aside from Hamas, appeared due to the severe security vacuum formed due to the destruction of Gaza, the collapse of its civilian administration, and the weakening of Hamas’s authority and control of the strip[1]. Furthermore, the dominant anti-Hamas militias such as the Popular Forces (Al Quwwāt ash-Shaʿbiyya), led by the 31-year-old Yasser Abu Shabab, surfaced in May 2024 as a direct challenge to Hamas’s authority while its history being notorious of organised crime that includes smuggling and systemic aid looting[2]. These groups are supported by Israel as it provides them with logistical, financial, and material support that includes weapons and operational assistance[3].

So far, Hamas has reacted firmly, if not brutally, against this challenge as the group has initiated a systemic campaign asserting its authority and ensuring that security is maintained under its auspices through its deployment of the Arrow (Sahm) and Radea units[4]. From armed raids to public executions to traitors and those collaborating with Israel, Hamas carried out severe enforcement methods that ensured its presence and rather its demonstration as the only visible security and governing body of Gaza strip. One may argue that one of the strategic mistakes Israel carried out in its attempt to eliminate Hamas, simply put, as it armed and supported militias to counter Hamas it inadvertently provided it with a strategic platform where its actions of suppressing looting and criminality are perceived heroically. Therefore, any post-conflict governance plan that excludes Hamas will be crippled by the current intra-Palestinian conflict that requires a legitimate security option[5].

II. Analysing the Fragmentation and Defining the Typology of the New Armed Groups

To further elaborate on these factions, they can be categorized into three distinct typologies that basis them on their origins, objectives, and structures:

• Traditional Clans: Clans such as the Doghmush and Mujaida clans are founded on deeply rooted tribal loyalties, a trait shared and well-known in the region. To understand the role and weight of such groups in Gaza, one has to look on its social architecture as it retains a strong reliance on a traditional system of authority and customary law. For the latter, it has been reported that customary law maintains legitimacy for 84% of the Gazan population whom will choose it over formal courts. What characterises these clans’ military mobilisation is opportunism as its objective is to maintain local governance, at least in their own territories.

More importantly, after the October 2023 Hamas attack on Israel, the Israeli occupation offered partnership opportunities to 12 major clans in early 2024 where 11 of them rejected to collaborate[6] notwithstanding that this rejection did not stem from an ideological commitment to Hamas and their allegiance to it, rather, it is nascent of complete opposition to the Israeli occupation.

• Fatah/Palestinian Authority (PA)-Linked Factions: Fatah, the long-standing rival of Hamas, do maintain presence through groups led by Yasser Khanidak leading the Khanidak clan and Rami Khalas/Hilles leading the Hilles clan. Fatah do support these politically motivated groups that are aligning with it to create political alternative to Hamas in the region[7].

This also includes the Counter-Terrorism Strike Force, led by Hussam Al-Astal who is a former member of the PA security service. This group, on the other hand, operates in southern city of Khan Yunis where al Al Astal demonstrated his intention to create a Gaza that ‘’belongs to its people’’[8]. By the same token, his group is supported and aided by the Israeli occupation to carry out disruptive operations against Hamas and Palestinian civilians in Gaza.

• Criminal-Political Militias: A set of hybrid groups and the most common one is the Popular Forces with an estimated size of 500-700 fighters who are led by the abovementioned Yasser Abu Shabab and his deputy Ghassan Duhine and both do share a similar criminal record and have been mostly associated with accusations of stealing aid from convoys during the conflict. Geographically, the group positions itself mainly in Rafah and also near the Kerem Shalom crossing to grant themselves access to supplies and humanitarian aid[9].

III. Proxy Warlordism and Strategic Miscalculations: What the Israeli Occupation Gets Wrong:

The confluence of a security breakdown along with a humanitarian crisis and aid dependence served as a catalyst for the new militia formation, particularly the criminal groups supported by the Israeli occupation. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netenyahu officially acknowledged in June 2024 that his government started a campaign that armed rival groups against Hamas, a campaign that intends to put a Palestinian face on the current genocide and systematic ethnic cleansing; a divide-and-conquer tactic that scholars like Rashid Khalidi, a prominent historian on Palestine, stated to be ‘’The oldest colonial tactic in the book’’. However, this divide-and-conquer strategy is not new to Israel, rather, the pattern has always been clear and the two most recent experiences can be highlighted in the following:

1. Netanyahu’s Government Support of Hamas 2012-2023: For years, Netenyahu’s government approved the transfers of Qatari funds to Hamas i.e., in October 2012 it allowed the transfer of $400 million to the Hamas government in Gaza[10]. This was a year later on followed by the Israeli government’s policy of ‘’Separation’’ to ensure that Gaza and the West Bank are divided in their ruling parties so as not to create a unified political establishment[11]. Over the years, this allowed Hamas to grow stronger and enabled it to create a well-founded presence that gained its legitimacy from maintaining order in the strip, nonetheless, the money that Netanyahu believed could sedate Hamas and maintain political division between Gaza and the West Bank have been an excruciating strategic mistake proven on October 7^th.[12]
2. Supporting Anti-Hamas Militias (2024-2025): With an imperative to undermine Hamas in the Gaza strip, Netanyahu’s government supports the Popular Forces to ensure that this objective is met, in addition to reducing the Israeli Occupation Forces (IOF) causalities. Even though supporting these groups against Hamas may cause disruption and a challenge to the latter, it damaged their stances severely. When Netanyahu announced on the 5^th of June 2025 on X ‘’On the advice of security officials, we activated clans in Gaza that oppose Hamas. What’s wrong with that? It’s only good. It saves lives of IDF soldiers.’’ he made it near impossible for these groups to maintain any form of legitimacy since they are perceived as puppets serving the occupation policies.

Even if on the short-term the current support for the militias by the occupation may cause disruption, it will backfire staunchly once Hamas restores order and regains its presence in the strip. Moreover, these militias do not carry any legitimacy at their core and rather are faced by public animosity and contempt towards their stances. Indeed, history teaches us on this regard and in other contexts as well that proxy militias seldomly outlive their sponsors and backfire on them sooner or later.

IV. The Governance Challenge and The Question of the ‘’Day After’’

The question of who is to govern Gaza and the need for a post-conflict governance structure is paramount. If looked at carefully, there are no functional, let alone legitimate, alternatives to Hamas at the moment. For instance, the suggestion called for in the ceasefire plan proposed by Trump of establishing a committee of Palestinian technocrats suffers from the fact that there is a critical deficit in authority and popular support for a specific alternative. Moreover, even though Hamas has been severely damaged from the conflict, it still maintained a physical presence by which it carried campaigns against these groups supported and backed by the Israeli occupation.

Thus, once more, Hamas is repositioning itself as Gaza’s indispensable legitimate authority and although though Trump’s proposed Peace Plan rejects its presence, it still offers itself as the only viable force in the forthcoming negotiations to be the most significant option. This, in turn, highlights that although the Israeli government’s tactical and strategic move that may serve short-term objectives, it is failing catastrophically. The road ahead requires a comprehensive governance plan that not only addresses filling the security gap but also ensures a Palestinian political reform, a reform aimed at addressing the Palestinian statehood question in tandem with reconstructing Gaza.

According to this overall analysis, the following strategic recommendations are warranted to tackle this emerging security and political dynamic:

1. Immediate Cessation of Support for Anti-Hamas Proxy Militias: To ensure the elimination of disruption, violence, and looting of aid, external actors, mainly Israel, must stop all logistical, financial, and militaristic support for these militias. Not only does this undermine the long-term stability objectives, but even if it may serve a particular objective on the short-term its future is opaque and in similar light these groups might end up against their own supporters.
2. Ensuring that Non-Armed Clans take Part in Stabilising the Situation: Clans and customary law are part and parcel of the Gazan societal structure and the weight of their role in maintain order is colossal if utilised properly. With these clans’ inherent legitimacy in different regions in Gaza, they maintain a mechanism for conflict resolution and these clans’ role is vital to ensure order and avoid any further repercussions. More importantly, these clans should in entirety be divorced from the geopolitical proxy conflicts so that they are not co-opted in the above-mentioned anti-Hamas campaigns.
3. Creating a Governance Roadmap: An internationally recognised roadmap is essential to provide a sustainable solution for the situation. Unlike Trump’s 20-points Peace Plan, this roadmap must include Palestinians and address a salient political dimension (Palestinian statehood). Currently, if the aforementioned challenges to security are dealt with the path to developing a roadmap will be feasible, and to a fair extent this needs the involvement of regional actors, particularly Arab states, to support Palestinians in their control of the future of Gaza.

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Mahmoud M. Abdallah is a Researcher at the Centre for Global Affairs (CGA) at Badr University. His research interests are in International Relations and Politics of Great Power Competition, Public Policy, and Political Economy of Development.

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[1] Myre, ‘Some of the Things Gaza Needs’.

[2] Sharawi and Truzman, ‘Profiles of Anti-Hamas Militias in the Gaza Strip’.

[3] Arab News, ‘Sky News Probe Uncovers New Details about Israel’s Support for Gaza Militia’.

[4] Shih et al., ‘Hamas Reasserts Control on Streets of Gaza, Turning Guns on Its Rivals’.

[5] Burke, ‘Hamas’s Aim to Retain Authority in Gaza Involves Keeping the Guns’.

[6] Neumann, ‘Israel’s “Tribal” Approach in Gaza’.

[7] Sharawi and Truzman, ‘Profiles of Anti-Hamas Militias in the Gaza Strip’.

[8] Mahadi, ‘Head of Anti-Hamas Gaza Militia to TML’.

[9] Arab News, ‘Sky News Probe Uncovers New Details about Israel’s Support for Gaza Militia’.

[10] Howidy, ‘Gaza’s Competing Militias Guarantee Perpetual Chaos’.

[11] Dyer, ‘How Netanyahu’s Hamas Policy Came Back to Haunt Him — and Israel’.

[12] Reiff, ‘The Not-so-Secret History of Netanyahu’s Support for Hamas’.