Department of Strategic Research, Studies and International Relations 07-10-2025

As the Gaza conflict deepens, Pakistan has taken a firm and independent stance, one that highlights its traditional support for the Palestinian cause while challenging the American–Israeli narrative dominating regional diplomacy. This article explores Islamabad’s position on U.S. President Donald Trump’s Gaza plan, tracing its historical roots, strategic motives, and the challenges Pakistan faces as it seeks to assert itself as a sovereign Islamic power allied with China, Russia, and the Global South rather than the West.

The U.S. plan for Gaza: an overview

In late September 2025, Donald Trump unveiled a 20-point “peace initiative” aimed at ending the war in Gaza. The plan called for an immediate ceasefire, the exchange of hostages, the disarmament of Hamas, and the reconstruction of Gaza under international supervision. It also proposed the formation of a temporary technocratic Palestinian government to oversee daily administration and a future roadmap toward a Palestinian state, while rejecting permanent Israeli occupation or forced displacement.

While Washington promoted the plan as a “balanced” solution, its underlying framework clearly protected Israeli security interests and legitimized ongoing Israeli control of Gaza’s borders. The plan received cautious support from some Arab states, namely Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Jordan, though each expressed reservations about Israel’s expanded “security perimeter” and the lack of guarantees for full Palestinian sovereignty.

Pakistan’s position: Between initial support and later rejection

Early Reception

At first, Islamabad responded diplomatically. Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif welcomed the plan, describing it as “a possible foundation for lasting peace in the Middle East,” while reiterating Pakistan’s long-standing support for a two-state solution based on the 1967 borders. Sharif also expressed Pakistan’s willingness to participate in future peacekeeping or reconstruction missions in Gaza under the banner of the United Nations or the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC).

This cautious endorsement was not merely about Gaza. It was also an attempt to reassert Pakistan’s relevance in the Muslim world, to balance India’s growing proximity to Tel Aviv and Washington, and to position Islamabad as a bridge between Arab states and emerging Eurasian powers like China and Russia.

The turning point

However, the tone in Islamabad shifted dramatically after the final version of Trump’s plan was released. Pakistani Foreign Minister Ishaq Dar stated before parliament that the version announced by Washington was “not the plan Pakistan co-authored,” adding that substantial modifications had been made without consultation.

These changes, most notably, the expansion of Israeli security zones inside Gaza and the indefinite stationing of Israeli forces near key border crossings, were viewed as blatant violations of Palestinian sovereignty. Islamabad firmly rejected the revised draft, emphasizing that any sustainable peace must be “rooted in justice, not occupation.”

By distancing itself from the American version of the plan, Pakistan aligned more closely with the growing bloc of nations, led by China, Russia, and Iran, that oppose U.S.-backed unilateralism in the Middle East.

Strategic context: Pakistan’s role in a multipolar Middle East

A Historical Bond

Pakistan’s involvement in Middle Eastern affairs is deeply rooted in shared Islamic and cultural heritage. Since its founding in 1947, Pakistan has viewed the Arab and broader Muslim world as both a moral and strategic community, one capable of counterbalancing Western dominance and Indian regional hegemony.

Throughout the Arab-Israeli wars of 1967 and 1973, Pakistani pilots trained Arab air forces and even participated in combat missions against Israel. Beyond military assistance, Islamabad consistently used its diplomatic channels to rally support for the Palestinian cause across the Muslim world, presenting itself as a defender of oppressed Muslim populations globally.

The Modern Recalibration

By 2025, Pakistan had begun recalibrating its Middle Eastern strategy, moving away from dependence on Western aid toward deeper cooperation with China, Russia, and Gulf partners. The signing of the Pakistan–Saudi Mutual Defense Agreement in September 2025 marked a historic milestone. Under this pact, both nations pledged coordinated responses to external aggression, implicitly extending Pakistan’s nuclear umbrella to safeguard Gulf security.

This development significantly shifted the regional balance. It not only reduced Riyadh’s dependence on Washington but also elevated Islamabad’s standing as a credible Muslim military power. For China and Russia, Pakistan’s expanded influence in the Gulf represents a valuable counterweight to Western interventionism.

Economically, millions of Pakistani workers in Saudi Arabia and the UAE generate over $30 billion annually in remittances, while Gulf investment continues to flow into Pakistan’s infrastructure and energy sectors. Such interdependence grants Islamabad both leverage and legitimacy in shaping regional policies, including the Gaza question.

Pakistan’s diplomatic calculus

Islamabad’s decision to oppose the U.S. version of the Gaza plan was not an emotional reaction, it was a strategic recalibration. Supporting a flawed American proposal that reinforced Israeli control would have alienated Pakistan from its Islamic allies and contradicted its historical principles.

Instead, Pakistan’s cautious dissent allowed it to:

• Reaffirm its Islamic identity, showcasing independence from Western dictates;
• Strengthen ties with Beijing and Moscow, whose leaders have condemned unilateral U.S. actions;
• Preserve credibility in the Muslim world, particularly among populations skeptical of Arab regimes normalizing with Israel;
• Undermine India’s diplomatic advances, as New Delhi continues to deepen its economic and defense cooperation with Tel Aviv.

In effect, Islamabad positioned itself as both a defender of the Palestinian cause and an emerging leader in the formation of a non-Western, multipolar order.

Challenges and prospects

Despite these strategic gains, Pakistan faces significant internal and external challenges. Domestically, sectarian tensions between Sunni and Shia groups complicate its balancing act between Saudi Arabia and Iran. Regionally, Washington’s pressure to align with its “anti-terror” agenda continues to test Islamabad’s autonomy.

Moreover, India’s growing involvement in the Gulf through projects like the India–Middle East–Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC) threatens to erode Pakistan’s influence. The new Saudi–Pakistan defense alignment, however, directly counters this trend by tying Riyadh’s security to Islamabad’s military structure.

Yet, Pakistan’s greatest challenge may lie in maintaining equilibrium, asserting independence from the West without alienating either Arab states or Iran, and leveraging its Islamic credentials while pursuing pragmatic cooperation with China and Russia.

Conclusion

Pakistan’s rejection of the altered U.S. Gaza plan marks more than a diplomatic disagreement, it symbolizes a broader geopolitical realignment. Islamabad is no longer content to play the role of a secondary partner in a U.S.-centric order. Instead, it seeks to lead an emerging coalition of Islamic and Eurasian nations advocating sovereignty, balance, and genuine justice for Palestine.

As Washington and Tel Aviv continue to treat the Middle East as a chessboard, Pakistan’s message is clear: peace cannot be dictated from afar. It must rise from within the region itself, on the principles of equality, self-determination, and resistance to occupation.