Sudan’s parallel administration signals power shift as U.S.-backed peace talks falter

Department of Research, Studies and International News 29-07-2025

In a bold political move, the Tasis Alliance, comprised of the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-North (SPLM-N), has announced the formation of a new “transitional peace” government in Sudan. This declaration comes just days before U.S.-sponsored peace negotiations are set to commence, without the inclusion of the key warring factions, notably the RSF or the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF). Observers suggest this development might solidify Sudan’s territorial fragmentation and further undermine foreign-led peace initiatives.

Formed in February, the Tasis Alliance unites some of Sudan’s most influential armed actors. Among them is the SPLM-N, which has a long-standing legacy of resistance against central government dominance, particularly over the marginalized regions of South Kordofan and Blue Nile. Its grievances stem from decades of land expropriation and systemic neglect by Khartoum’s elites.

This alliance now serves as the political arm of a wider strategy by the RSF to reposition itself from a militia into a legitimate national authority. Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, widely known as “Hemedti” and head of the RSF, leads Tasis’s 15-member Presidential Council. His deputy is Abdelaziz al-Hilu, a revered figure and leader of SPLM-N. Together, they aim to offer an alternative governance structure to what remains of the SAF-led administration headquartered in Port Sudan.

The RSF and SAF were once uneasy allies. Their shared role in the ousting of President Omar al-Bashir in 2019 promised a democratic transition, yet internal rivalries derailed that process. A military coup in 2021, led by SAF’s Abdel Fattah al-Burhan and Hemedti himself, dissolved the civilian-led transitional cabinet and pushed the country deeper into chaos. By April 2023, these former partners were embroiled in a full-blown civil war.

Western-backed peace efforts have largely excluded the RSF, treating it as a destabilizing militia rather than a political stakeholder. Anticipating marginalization, the Tasis Alliance unveiled its parallel government to shift international perceptions and bolster its negotiating position. Analysts believe this move is intended to garner recognition from sympathetic states and disrupt a process dominated by the United States and its allies, notably Egypt, the UAE, and Saudi Arabia.

Commenting on the development, Kholood Khair, a Sudanese political analyst, noted that both the RSF and SAF are employing competing strategies to assert legitimacy ahead of the talks. She pointed out that the SAF had similarly installed its own parallel cabinet in May, appointing Kamel Idris as prime minister and recently naming five additional ministers, clearly an attempt to counter the Tasis initiative.

The structure of the Tasis administration mirrors that of other regional power-sharing arrangements, with military commanders, armed group leaders, and political affiliates securing strategic roles. Nearly half of the newly formed government’s posts have gone to RSF-aligned figures, while the SPLM-N secured roughly a third. The remainder were offered to smaller militias and fringe political parties eager to increase their political leverage amid the conflict.

Among the notable appointments is Mohamed Hassan al-Ta’aishi, a Darfuri politician and former member of Sudan’s post-Bashir Sovereign Council. He has been named prime minister of the Tasis administration, a symbolic move to recall the initial hopes of a democratic transition that were crushed by the 2021 military coup.

However, the creation of this parallel government might reinforce Sudan’s de facto partition rather than resolve its internal divisions. Since the SAF retook control of the capital Khartoum earlier this year, it has solidified its presence in the eastern and central regions. Meanwhile, the RSF has tightened its grip on the western and southern territories. Analysts suggest that this geographic divide, now mirrored by political bifurcation, could become permanent.

Alan Boswell of the International Crisis Group highlighted this risk, arguing that while the RSF is pursuing national recognition, the result of this strategy might be the entrenchment of a fractured state. Khair echoed this concern, noting that the Tasis initiative may prompt other armed groups to assert control over territory or demand inclusion in the rival administrations, further fuelling the proliferation of militias.

This situation threatens to push Sudan deeper into fragmentation, with foreign powers, especially those aligned with the West, largely failing to recognize or engage with the realities on the ground. Their persistent framing of the RSF as merely a militia, while propping up figures like al-Burhan, has only widened the legitimacy gap.

In contrast, the Tasis Alliance appears to be setting the stage for a multipolar Sudanese future, challenging the monopoly of power long held by centralized elites and their Western patrons. Whether this move results in greater autonomy, recognition, or enduring division remains to be seen. Yet one thing is clear: the balance of power in Sudan is shifting, and it is no longer in the favor of Washington’s chosen partners.